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LENDER LIABILITY FOR DISCOVERABLE STRUCTURAL
DEFECTS IN NEW TRACT HOUSING
During the past decade the residential construction industry has under-
gone substantial structural change. Many residential contractors today
build housing developments of five hundred and more homes, whereas
in 1950 the average contractor built only three or four homes per year.'
Just as mass production techniques in the automotive industry, for exam-
ple, have generated novel legal remedies,2 the marketing of housing on a
massive scale has required an evolution in legal theory.
In the sale of residential property, most states8 still adhere to the strict
common law rule of caveat emptor, which provides that there is no implied
warranty of freedom from structural defects in a conveyance of realty;
the vendee accepts the property as is and assumes full responsibility for
defects. 4 The plethora of exceptions to this rigid rule, however, has con-
tinued to expand.5 Early exceptions to the rule were permitted in cases
of fraud,0 on nuisance theories,7 and where particular use by the purchaser
was intended to be or reasonably could be anticipated." More recently,
several jurisdictions have explicitly asserted an implied warranty of hab-
itability or good workmanship in the sale of new housing.9 A few states
1. Brehm, The Residential Construction Industry, in ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 108, 112 (1960).
2. E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
4. See, e.g., Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884
(1961); Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128, 341 P.2d 923 (1959); Dooley v. Berkner, 113 Ga.
App. 162, 147 S.E.2d 685 (1966).
5. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in the Sale of Realty-Recent Assaults upon
the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); Dunham, Vendors Obligation as to Fitness
of Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953).
6. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Elmore & Hamilton Contracting Co., 175 F. 176
(N.D. N.Y. 1909); O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012
(1910); Belote v. Memphis Development Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 336 S.W.2d 441
(1961); Dooley v. Berkner, supra note 5; Bray v. Cross, 98 Ga. App. 612, 106
S.E.2d 315 (1958).
7. Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 A. 883 (1911); Delaney v. Supreme Inv.
Co., 251 Wis. 374, 29 N.W.2d 754 (1947); Schumacher v. Carl G. Neumann
Dredging & Imp. Co., 206 Wis. 220, 239 N.W. 459 (1931).
8. Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 A. 794 (1931); Cf. Colbert v.
Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928); McGlone v. William
Angus Inc., 248 N.Y. 197, 161 N.E. 469 (1928).
9. E.g., F & S Construction Co. v. Berube, 322 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1963);
Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Humber v. Morton,
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have gone further by applying negligence, 10 products liability," and strict
liability theories.' 2 Thus the scope of relief for defects in new housing
has been expanded by widening the grounds for relief and by dispensing
with the requirements of privity, thereby extending relief to a larger
group of plaintiffs-subsequent purchasers and injured third parties.
However, even the broad remedies of products liability and strict lia-
bility are inadequate against an insolvent or defunct construction com-
pany. There are thousands of small companies that enter and leave the
residential construction industry according to the ebb and flow of demand
for housing and availability of financing.' 3 It is not unusual for a con-
tractor to create a company to undertake a single development and then
dissolve it after completing the project.' 4 Furthermore, since most con-
struction firms, even those undertaking large developments, are severely
undercapitalized and must obtain almost total financing from savings and
loan associations at relatively high cost in terms of fees and interest, 15 the
stage was set for an extension of liability far beyond the comparative de-
velopment of products liability. In the future, where a valid claim of an
aggrieved home purchaser is frustrated by an insolvent or defunct con-
tractor, he may have recourse against the institutional lender which coop-
erated with the irresponsible builder. In the case of Connor v. Great
Western Savings and Loan Ass'n.,'8 the California Supreme Court has
made the first step toward imposing liability on an institutional lender for
structural defects in new housing.
The objective of this paper is threefold: to briefly discuss the peculiar
role of the savings and loan association in the residential construction in-
426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968); Westwood Development Co. v. Esponge, 342
S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
10. E.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889 (1963); Mitchem v.
Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C.
128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968); Belote v. Memphis Development Co., 51 Tenn. App. 423,
369 S.W.2d 97 (1962).
11. E.g., Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958);
Lowe v. Francis Constr. Co., 373 P.2d 51 (Okla. 1962); Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361
P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961);
Freeman v. Mazzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 309 P.2d 510 (1957).
12. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 S.2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 912 (1967).
13. See Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE
L.J. 1271, 1273-82 (1965); LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 631 (1966); Smith
Low Rise Speculative Apartment, 50, 52, Real Estate Research Program, University
of California, Berkeley (1964).
14. Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 13, at 1277.
15. Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 13, at 1276. See also Connor v. Great West-
ern Saving and Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373, 447 P.2d 609, 611 (1968).
16. Supra note 15.
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dustry; to analyze the nature and scope of the duty imposed by Connor;
and to assess the practical implications of such a duty for the institutional
lender.
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Approximately sixty-five per cent of the builders in America construct
less than forty per cent of the single family homes each year, 17 usually
contracting with the owner of the land to build a dwelling on an individual
or build-to-suit basis. Builders in this group generally construct between
ten and twenty-five units per year.18 The remaining builders are gener-
ally termed "speculative" builders. A speculative development involves
the purchase of a large tract of land, the construction of twenty to five
hundred and more homes, and finally (during or after construction of the
homes) sale of the homes to purchasers.'0 The large scale developer thus
acts in a dual capacity: as builder and as salesman. In the latter cate-
gory, developers typically use mass production merchandising techniques;
for example, several model homes may be built for inspection by prospec-
tive buyers. On the basis of the model, the purchaser may contract to
buy a house before, during, or after its actual construction. The position
of a purchaser in a tract development thus stands in sharp contrast to an
individual who arranges for construction of a custom-made house. Al-
though in either case a purchaser may be dissatisfied with the quality of
materials and workmanship put into his house, studies report the most
vociferous complaints are from purchasers in tract developments. 20
For a number of legal and economic reasons, savings and loan associa-
tions contribute the bulk of financing for almost all tract developments. 2'
First, restrictions on investments and loans imposed by statute and Internal
Revenue Service rulings generally limit associations to investing most of
their available funds in loans on residential properties, predominantly on
one to four family units.2 2 The tract developer is thus an attractive and
logical borrower. A second consideration involves the market forces
under which a savings and loan association must operate. The cost of
obtaining capital is high for a savings and loan association because it
17. Rogg, The Changing Home Building Industry, in UNITED STATES SAVINGS
AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS AND LOAN ANNALS 1960 at 167, 175.
18. Id.
19. Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 13, at 1283; Brehm, supra note 1, at 124-5.
20. Herzog, The Dynamics of Large-Scale Housebuilding 39, Real Estate Re-
search Program, University of California, Berkeley (1963).
21. Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 13, at 1273-82, 1297.
22. UNITED STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, 1969 SAVINGS & LOAN FACT BOOK
102 [hereinafter cited as 1969 FACT BOOK].
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must rely on savings deposits, and, to compete successfully with other
associations it must pay relatively high interest rates to its savers. In
order to make profit, the association must then make mortgage loans and
charge a higher rate of interest than they are paying out on passbook ac-
counts.
Although the profitable operation of a savings and loan association is
simply described, the existing mortgage concept makes such a goal difficult
to achieve. During the depression of the 1930's, the present form of
mortgage loan was established; its basic features include a fixed interest
rate, a fixed term over which the mortgage is amortized (usually twenty
to thirty years) and a fixed monthly payment which includes both princi-
pal and interest. With each succeeding payment, then, the proportion of
the fixed payment attributable to principal increases, and the proportion
attributable to interest decreases because the outstanding principal amount
owed declines. Thus, payments early in the term are predominantly in-
terest, and payments near the end of the term are primarily principal.
This existing mortgage concept has been described by the United States
Savings and Loan League (USSLL) as "antiquated. '23 A study commit-
tee of the USSLL reported: "[T]he current mortgage concept 'assures
recurring and deep fluctuations in the supply of funds to the residential
market and chronic uncertainties and inefficiencies in home buildings.' "24
The problem presently is that the general inflationary trend of the last
twenty-five years, and especially the last several years, has left the asso-
ciations with many undesirable loans on their books. For example, many
mortgage loans made between 1955 and 1960, had interest rates of three
to five per cent, which was a desirable return at that time. But in 1970,
with ten to fifteen years remaining on the fixed terms of many of such
loans, and the prime lending rate approaching nine per cent, these loans
are extremely costly to carry. In fact, the aforementioned study commit-
tee of the USSLL found that "[m]any home borrowers today earn higher
interest on their savings then they pay on their mortgages. '25
In response to this problem, several solutions have been proffered, two
of which are worthy of note: the "variable-interest" mortgage, and the
"variable-term" loan. The "variable-interest" mortgage would tie the
loan interest rate to an index which generally reflects the economic condi-
tions of the country (for example, the prime rate, or the cost-of-living
index). Such a provision is not uncommon now in the area of construction
23. Chicago Tribune, March 22, 1970, § 3A (Real Estate and Rental Guide),
at 1, col. 5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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loans for commercial property; the borrower pays interest at a fixed rate
above the prime rate on this interim loan, which is for a short term. The
latter theory-the "variable-term" loan-is popular in Europe. Under
this system, the monthly payment remains fixed while the termination date
of the loan fluctuates in response to an index reflecting economic condi-
tions. Thus, the "effective" interest rate on the loan fluctuates. A Report
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board showed that in May, 1969, fifteen
per cent of the savings and loan associations favored such a plan, while
six per cent actually used such a device as standard policy.28 What
makes the "variable-term" loans more attractive to the borrower is that
his monthly payment stays the same; this factor is more important to him
than the interest rate.27
The objections to these plans are obvious: the buyer fears that interest
rates could sky-rocket and force him to lose his home; the lender, on the
other hand, fears being wiped-out if a deflationary period sets in.
Certain restrictions could mitigate these fears: the maximum fluctua-
tion either way could be fixed; the frequency of change in term or rate
could be restricted; and the borrower could be given the option of accept-
ing the change, or paying off the loan by refinancing at another institu-
tion.28  Until such time, however, that the lending institution will be able
to cope with their existing problems in order to maintain a profitable oper-
ation, they will be forced to maximize returns. But as the return in-
creases, so also does the risk;29 therefore, although a greater return can
be realized on a loan to an undercapitalized builder, risks of insolvency
and associated problems accompany such a loan. The risk factor is in-
creased further by the tendency to apply liberal value-to-loan ratios. That
is, in return for relatively high interest, a savings and loan typically makes
a loan secured at somewhat below commercial standards.80
The necessity of maximizing returns on investments, and the legal re-
straints limiting investment largely to residential developments make the
construction industry an exceptionally attractive market for savings and
loan associations. Contractors are often willing to pay high interest rates
as well as lending fees of one to five per cent of the entire loan.3' How-
ever, it is important to note the risk factors that accompany the relatively
26. Id., col. 6.
27. Id., col. 6.
28. id., col. 6.
29. Of a total of 34,495 F.H.A. foreclosures in 1968, 32,512 were financed by
savings and loan associations. Supra note 22, 1969 FAcT BOOK at 50.
30. Supra note 20, at 37.
31. Id. See Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, supra note 15,
at 372, 447 P.2d at 614. Fees generally are set at one-third per cent of the loan, but
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high return. Contractors are willing to pay high rates because commercial
loans are unavailable to undercapitalized developers with few assets to
provide security. The high cost of obtaining capital in turn squeezes the
profit margin. Large scale developers are often tempted to "cut corners"
in both workmanship and design; thus undercapitalized developments may
yield undercapitalized and defective construction. s2
In order to protect their investment, savings and loan associations em-
ploy standardized procedures of investigation and appraisal. Before a
loan application may be approved, the solvency and experience of the
contractor is examined, and the design plans and specifications are ana-
lyzed. If the loan is approved, payments are made periodically to the
contractor upon presentation of lien waivers, and an experienced ap-
praiser inspects the progress of construction before each payout is made.88
The lender is thus intimately involved in all phases of the development.
An examination of the facts in Connor will provide further insight into
construction lending procedures and the peculiar relationship between
the lender and the developer. The relationship formed by the financing
arrangement will, in turn, form the basis for an analysis of the duty of
reasonable care imposed on the lender by Connor.
In Connor, Goldberg and Brown, owners of the South Gate Develop-
ment Company, planned to develop a five hundred and forty-seven acre
ranch in Conejo Valley, California, into a community of approximately
two thousand homes.8 4 Goldberg, a former haberdasher, had four years
experience as a real estate broker and had undertaken a thirty-one home
development the previous year. Brown had built about fifty homes on a
custom basis in the previous eight years, but had limited experience super-
vising tract construction. Through South Gate, the two individuals nego-
tiated with Great Western Savings and Loan Association in order to obtain
financing for the purchase of one hundred acres of land and financing
for the construction of about four hundred houses. Great Western agreed
to finance the project, but insisted on terms which would ensure a rela-
exceptionally risky loans justify fees up to 5 per cent. Interview with John Schmidt,
Chief Architect, United States Savings & Loan League, in Chicago, December 2,
1969 [hereinafter League interview].
32. Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 13 at 1273-82. See also Wiemer, Business
& Real Estate Trends in 1965, UNITED STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE ANNALS,
1964 at 33, 36: "[economic growth requires savings & loan associations to take on]
riskier projects than may have been warranted by the conditions under which they
are operating."
33. UNITED STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE, CONSTRUCTION LENDING GUIDE,
Addendum A at 38-39 (1967).
34. The summary of the complex financing arrangments set out in some detail
by Chief Justice Traynor is to be found in Connor v. Great Western Saving and
Loan Association, supra note 15, at 371, 375, 447 P.2d at 609-13.
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tively high return. Great Western agreed to supply funds for the land
purchase through an intricate arrangement whereby Great Western would
purchase the land, and resell it to the developers at a twenty thousand
dollar profit.35 Goldberg and Brown incorporated Conejo Develop-
ment Company for the purpose of funneling funds and taking title to
the tract. The corporation had a mere five thousand dollars in assets.
Great Western agreed to make a three million dollar construction loan
at a 6.6 per cent interest rate and charged a service fee of five per cent
of the total loan.36 Great Western conditioned this commitment upon the
pre-sale of a specified number of houses-that is, sold before construc-
tion. The lender made a further condition that all home purchasers obtain
twenty-four year mortgages of approximately eighty per cent of the pur-
chase price at 6.6 per cent interest. Great Western charged Conejo a
one per cent fee for loans to qualified purchasers and one and one-half
per cent to purchasers considered to be poor risks, reserving the right to
refuse financing to risky purchasers; but if an approved buyer sought
financing elsewhere, the developers were then required to pay Great
Western the fees and interest obtained by the other lender. Before con-
struction actually began, Great Western sent a geologist out to the area
to check on the availability of water. The lender then obtained a corpo-
rate and individual obligation from the developers to ensure that adequate
water service would be available for consumer use. During the period
of construction, the lender dispatched an appraiser to inspect the progress
of construction on a weekly basis. Great Western retained the right to
stop the flow of construction funds if work did not conform to plans and
specifications; failure to correct a defect within fifteen days would consti-
tute a default. However, notwithstanding this intricate scheme for con-
trol and approval, the lender departed from its normal procedure of re-
viewing and approving plans and specifications before making a commit-
ment to provide funds. The lender failed to discover that the designs
were "borrowed" from a previous development, and that the design was
inadequate for the particular locale; the development was put up on adobe
soil which has a tendency to crack and expand in changing weather condi-
tions. Because this factor was not considered in the designs and specifi-
cations, the foundations were defective for that area. Within two years
after completion of the homes, a number of foundations cracked. The
purchasers brought suit against the developers, and later joined the lender
35. This arrangement is termed "land warehousing" and permits the lender to
realize an artificial capital gain. See note 55 infra and text.
36. The exorbitant nature of Great Western's return is clear. A fee of one to
three points is typical for construction loans, supra note 31. Also, the interest rate
of 6.6 per cent is rather high for the year the loan was made-1959.
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as a party defendant.
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT BASES FOR IMPOSING LIABILITY
THE "DEEPER POCKET"
Joining the lender as a party defendant can be laid to several strategies
both implicit and explicit. The search for a "deeper pocket" is perhaps
the most basic impetus behind extensions of liability. As Dean Prosser
noted in an analogous situation:
The alarming increase in traffic accidents, together with the frequent financial
irresponsibility of the individual driving the car, has led to a search for some basis
for imposing liability upon the owner of the vehicle . . . . Bluntly put, it is felt
that since automobiles are expensive, the owner is more likely to be able to pay
any damages than the driver . . .a8
By analogy, the building contractor is the financially irresponsible
"driver," the "vehicle" is cash financing, and the deep pocketed owner
is the savings and loan association. Of course the mere ability to pay is
not a basis of liability, but it is generally a practical prerequisite for any
serious attempt to extend liability.
RECOVERY BY THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Recovery by the home purchaser against the lender as a third party
beneficiary of the contract for financing between the lender and the tract
developer is a somewhat questionable theory. A right of action accrues
to a third party where the promisor breaches an obligation intended to
benefit that third person.a8 It would be difficult to find language in the
financing agreement between lender and developer directly affecting a
particular purchaser because such agreements are generally executed be-
fore construction begins and before any such purchaser exists. Even
where home purchasers contract with the developer before the developer
finalizes financing with the lender, the purchaser can be no more than
an incidental beneficiary, unless the buyer is specifically mentioned, or
there is a showing that the promisor knew or should have known that the
performance was for the benefit of the particular purchaser.8 9 A case
in this category "would seem more properly treated as raising simply a
37. PROSSER, TORTS, § 72 at 494-95 (3rd ed. 1964).
38. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 347 (Jaeger ed. 1959).
39. Shine v. Nash Abstract & Investment Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47(1928); Smither Roofing Co. v. Helen Realty Co., 90 Ind. App. 52, 168 N.E. 44(1929); Safran v. Westrich, 136 Misc. 81, 240 N.Y.S. 238 (1930). See Pfeiler,
Lenders' Liability in Tract Financing, 33 LEGAL BULL. 85, 108-09 (1969) wherein
the author cautions lenders against using such language in drafting financing agree-
ments.
question of liability for negligence."' 40 However, a California appellate
court recently cited Connor in support of the general proposition that third
party beneficiaries may recover for obligations assumed for their benefit. 4'
JOINT VENTURES
A joint venture consists of an agreement by which the parties undertake
an enterprise with limited objectives. Each of the parties must have
"community of interest" which includes mutual rights of control and of
sharing in profits. 42  The situation in Connor, which approximates the
typical contemporary tract development, is quite close to a joint venture.
Both lender and developer combined their skill, property and knowledge
to carry out the project; each shared in control, and each anticipated sub-
stantial profits. However, the California Supreme Court rejected this
theory because neither party had a specific interest in payments received
by the other.43 This appears to be a rather rigid interpretation and ap-
plication of the element of "sharing profits;" all other elements of a joint
venture were clearly present, and the court itself noted that "the profits
of each were dependent on the overall success of the development. '4
4
It is important to note that some financing arrangements, and particu-
larly those which provide for "tie-in-financing," may constitute a joint
venture as defined and applied by the California courts. For example,
an agreement between lender and developer may contain a "kicker clause"
which allows a lender to participate in any increase in gross earnings from
rent. 45 The "kicker clause" thus provides for an actual sharing of partic-
ular profits and would create a joint venture. 4
A DUTY OF CARE IMPOSED BY LAW
A voluntary undertaking may create a duty to reasonably control the
conduct of another for the protection of a third party. The rationale for
this duty of care has been stated in these terms:
40. Supra note 38, at § 402, p. 1090.
41. Allied Concord Financial Corporation v. Bank of America Nat. T. & S. Ass'n,
275 Cal. App. 2d 586, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (1969). See also, Lucas v. Hamm,
56 Cal. 2d 583, 589-91, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (1961); Johnson v. Homes Tuttle
Lincoln-Merc., 160 Cal. App. 2d 290, 325 P.2d 193 (1958); Watson v. Aced, 156
Cal. App. 2d 87, 319 P.2d 83 (1957).
42. Supra note 37, at 488-93; Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture, 41
CORNELL L. Q. 640-50 (1956).
43. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra note 15, at 375, 477
P.2d at 615-16 (1968).
44. Supra note 16, at 369, 477 P.2d at 615-16 (1968).
45. 1969 FACT BOOK, supra note 22, at 21.
46. See Pfeiler, supra note 39, where the writer warns lenders against such
procedures.
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If the conduct of the actor has brought him into a human relationship with another,
of such character that sound social policy requires either some affirmative action
or some precaution on his part to avoid harm, the duty to act or take the pre-
caution is imposed by law.4 7
The closeness of the relationship, giving rise to a reasonable opportunity
to foresee potential harm to a third party, and the existence of a reason-
able opportunity to control harmful conduct are one set of factors which
determines the imposition of such a duty.48 A second consideration is
whether public policy dictates the existence of such a duty. 49
THE CONNOR CASE-PRESENT LENDER LIABILITY
The Connor trial court entered a non-suit in favor of Great Western
and the plaintiff-homeowner appealed, arguing that the lender's liability
arose from two bases: a theory of vicarious liability arising from a joint
venture with the developer; and a theory that a voluntary undertaking
creating risk of harm to third parties, forseeabiity of that harm, and an
ability to prevent that harm creates in turn a duty to use reasonable care.
The appellate court rejected the joint venture theory, but held a lender to
a duty to reasonably inspect construction to prevent "gross . . . construc-
tion problems." 50  The appellate court found the duty to arise from the
ordinary and standard relationship between construction lender and buyer,
noting that the overall arrangement in Connor was "a typical example of
contemporary tract development." 51
The California Supreme Court affirmed, but on somewhat narrower
grounds.52 Justice Traynor agreed that lack of privity between lender
and purchaser will not absolve the lender of liability for its own negligence
in creating an unreasonable risk of harm to the purchaser. A duty of
care "may arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship if public policy
dictates the existence of such a duty." 53 The court, however, explained
the imposition of duty in terms of factors exceeding the ordinary con-
struction loan arrangement. Chief Justice Traynor found that Great
Western "became much more than a lender content to lend money at in-
47. Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L.J. 886 (1934). See also, James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L.
REv. 778, 809-13 (1953).
48. Harper & Kime, supra note 47, at 887-8.
49. See infra notes 71-74 & text.
50. Connor v. Conejo Valley Development Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333, 347 (1967).
51. Id., at 336.
52. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra note 15.
53. Id., at 377, 447 P.2d at 617, quoting Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552,
561-62, 375 P.2d 304, 311 (1962).
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terest on the security of real property. '54 In addition to charging interest
on the construction loan, the lender also charged a fee for making the
loan, collected a twenty percent capital gain on a land "warehousing"
transaction, and required either permanent financing from each purchaser
or in the alternative, a penalty fee from the developer. These extra
factors are important because they appear to substantially limit bases for
imposing liability on the construction lender; yet these factors are not es-
sential to the relationship of closeness and control that creates the duty
in the first instance.
The first conclusion as to the highly defined grounds for imposing a
duty on an institutional lender is sustained by a recent California appellate
court decision. In Bradley v. Craig,5 5 by way of dictum only, the court
extensively discussed Connor and decided that liability could be imposed
only on the most narrow grounds. After disposing of the case on the
statute of limitations, the court held that Connor would not apply to a
lender which financed a five house tract, and which did not require "tie-
in-financing." Such a transaction did not involve sufficient participation
by the lender, nor sufficient intent to affect the plaintiff to justify imposing
a duty of care. 56
The second point-that the "extra factors" required in Connor to im-
pose liability are superfluous and should not exclude an ordinary con-
struction lender from liability-can be demonstrated by an examination
of ordinary construction lending practices in terms of the rationale for
imposing a duty of care towards third parties not in privity. As discussed
above, savings and loan associations find construction loans attractive be-
cause of high interest rates; yet contractors pay such high rates because
they cannot qualify for ordinary commercial loans. 57 Thus construction
lenders, as a matter of standard practice, follow a number of procedures
to protect the security of their investment. In a tight money market
(lender's market), when a contractor applies for a loan, the loan commit-
tee carefully scrutinizes both the solvency and experience of the con-
tractor.58  Large savings and loan associations typically deal with only
the firmly established, well-known contractors, 59 while smaller lenders
54. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan, supra note 15, at 376, 447,
P.2d at 616.
55. Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d-, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
56. Id., at-, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 407-8.
57. See infra note 32 and text.
58. Supra note 20, at 39. See also 33 LEGAL BULL. 324, 326 (1967) which
criticizes Connor at the appellate level but concedes that large institutional lenders
possess "expert technical knowledge" of the residential construction industry.
59. Interview with Robert Ulbrict, General Counsel, Bell Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation of Chicago, November 28, 1969. It is important to note that under condi-
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cannot be as selective. Different economic conditions, however, can force
the associations, large or small, to lend money to more inexperienced
builders,60 resulting in correspondingly higher risks.
Whether dealing with an experienced or with an unknown builder, a
savings and loan employs further procedures to protect its investment.
Before the loan is approved, the plans and specifications are reviewed for
both safety features and to ascertain market value. Larger institutions
maintain a staff of qualified architects and engineers; smaller lenders
will "farm-out" plans for examination by architectural firms.61 Further-
more, inspection of the site is made by an experienced appraiser to check
the propriety of design to the locale.62 If there are any problems in
either safety or marketing factors, the lender will insist upon appropriate
changes before making a loan committment. 63
The third stage of the lending arrangement involves actual construction
of the development. After approving a construction loan, the lender does
not simply pay out the entire amount to the builder. The loan is paid out
in installments, and an appraiser inspects the construction site to ensure
substantial conformance with design specifications. If a "major defect" is
discovered, payments are discontinued until a correction is made.64 Lend-
ers also typically retain five to ten per cent of the loan until construction
is completed in order to provide security against unexpected or overlooked
defects. 65
Professor Herzog has concluded that "[it can truthfully be said that
nearly everything the builder does is at least partially determined by his
financing arrangements. ' 66  The fact of the lender's extensive control is
further demonstrated by long-standing policies of the United States Savings
and Loan League. This organization publishes a "Construction Lending
Guide ' 67 which sets out general principles of sound construction tech-
nique. The "Guide" further recommends all the construction lending
tions of excess money supply, the savings and loan association is under pressure to
invest in riskier projects.
60. Id.
61. Interview with Mrs. LaRocca, President, Allied Savings and Loan Associa-
tion of Chicago, December 6, 1969.
62. Specialists will also be sent out if needed. For example, in Connor the
lender sent a geologist to inspect the area for water service. Connor v. Great
Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra note 15, at 372, 447 P.2d at 612.
63. Interview with Lester Ballerine, Vice President, First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n of Chicago, December 2, 1969.
64. Bell interview, supra note 59.
65. Supra note 52, at 376, 447 P.2d at 616.
66. Supra note 20, at 33.
67. UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LoAN LEAGUE, CONSTRUCTION LENDING GUIDE
(1964).
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procedures discussed in detail above. 68 For years, League officials have
urged savings and loan officials to consider esthetic values and community
needs before approving construction loans. 69 Implicit in such recommen-
dations is the ability of the lender to influence builders on such policies.
Thus it is clear from the foregoing that a construction lender exercises
substantial control over the planning and actual construction of a housing
development. This relationship, in and of itself, creates the "closeness"
to foresee possible harm to home purchasers, and the "control" to prevent
that harm. The "extra factors" which Chief Justice Traynor held to im-
pose liability in Connor are not relevant to "closeness" and "control."
Land warehousing was an "extra factor," yet this was only a procedure
by which the lender generated an artificial capital gain.70 The arrange-
ment for "tie-in-financing" to home purchasers is likewise an arrangement
for increasing the lender's profit, yet it does not significantly affect either
the close relationship between lender and builder, or the amount of control
held by the lender.
Although the "extra factors" are irrelevant to "control" and "closeness,"
they do appear relevant to the matter of public policy-the second basis
for imposing a duty of care upon a construction lender. In Connor the
public policy criteria for imposing a duty were derived from six points
established in Biakanja v. Irving:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to
a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
various factors, among which are (1) the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to him, (3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and injury suffered, (5) the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future
harm. 71
Chief Justice Traynor went on to discuss the facts of the Connor case
in terms of the Biakanja policy criteria and on each point found that a
duty of care should be imposed on the construction lender. The "extra
factors" noted above appear to be important, if not decisive, in reaching
the policy decision. For example, "tie-in-financing" for home purchasers
was held to indicate that the construction lender's transactions were in-
68. Id., CONSTRUCTION LOAN & PROCEDURES at 5.
69. See also Odell, COMBATING UGLINESS IN AMERICA, UNITED STATES SAVINGS
& LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS & LOAN ANNALS 1964 at 109; Panel Discussion on
Residential Construction Standards, reported in UNITED STATED SAVINGS & LOAN
LEAGUE, SAVINGS & LOAN ANNALS 1961 at 151 (statement of C.W. Ford: "It's
our responsibility to strive for better design and better construction.").
70. Supra note 20.
71. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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tended to significantly affect the plaintiffs.72
The carefully drawn imposition of liability in Connor, and the subse-
quent discussion of Connor in Bradley, indicate that an insitutional lender
is burdened with a duty of care towards home purchasers only if its financ-
ing takes on "ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money
lender."'73 As the above discussion pointed out, the carefully drawn im-
position of liability is a matter of judicial policy; the ordinary construction
lender is in fact "beyond the domain of the usual money lenders. '74
Thus it seems probable that the "extra factors" required in Connor may
be gradually chipped away until an ordinary construction lender also has
a duty of reasonable care toward home purchasers in financing tract de-
velopments.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LENDER LIABILITY
In addition to the question of when a duty is imposed on an institu-
tional lender, two further matters deserve discussion: the scope of the duty
of care and policies which may mitigate against lender liability in con-
struction financing.
A duty of care imposed on an institutional lender is a duty to make
reasonable inspections. In order to find a breach of that duty the defect
complained of must have been of such a nature that it could be discovered
through normal appraisal of plans, surveys, engineering reports, and on
site inspections. Most gross structural defects are discoverable by ex-
perienced appraisers on the staff of lending institutions. 75 However, loan
officers interviewed generally agreed that certain defects such as installa-
tion of defective wiring might be covered up as work progressed. It
seems unlikely that failure to detect such a defect would constitute a breach
of the duty to reasonably inspect. The duty is determined by the under-
taking, and the lender undertakes only to ensure the security of his invest-
ment. It follows that a lender's duty of care would not be breached under
the facts of the Levitt76 case where an injury occurred from the negligent
installation of a hot water heater. The lender does not usually undertake
a warranty of good workmanship toward the purchaser. 77
72. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra note 15, at 374, 447
P.2d at 612.
73. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra note 15, at 375,
447 P.2d at 613.
74. Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra note 15, at 375,
447 P.2d at 613.
75. Supra note 59.
76. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
77. But see 3740 Lake Shore Drive Association v. Talman Savings & Loan, No.
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When a defect falls into the grey area between a major structural defect
and a latent defect not discoverable by reasonable inspection, the courts
may apply a negligence standard similar to that imposed on architects and
engineers who contract with owners to design buildings and act as general
supervisors of the contractor's work.78 An early decision described that
duty:
In performing the work which he undertook, it was [an engineer's] duty to exercise
such care and diligence as men engaged in that profession ordinarily exercise under
like circumstances. He was not an insurer that the contractors would perform
their work properly in all respects; but it was his duty to exercise reasonable care
to see that they did so.79
A standard of this nature will not excessively burden the loan association,
for any prudent lender protecting its own investment would exercise such
diligence as a matter of ordinary procedure.
There are a number of alternatives by which a loan association may
protect itself from incurring liability in construction lending. The general
counsel of a large Chicago savings and loan expressed confidence that
"internal policy" would provide adequate security.8 0 Such policy re-
stricts lending to contractors who are highly capitalized and have long
standing reputations for experience in the construction industry. This
restrictive policy, is, however, not feasible to the same extent for smaller
loan associations. To the small-scale lender, three alternatives are avail-
able: refrain from making construction loans; require a quality bond
from the contractor; or carry indemnity insurance. Since construction
lending is a basic investment for loan associations, and under the present
system which restricts the type of investments loan associations may make,
it seems unlikely that loan associations will leave the construction lending
business. 81
All loan officers interviewed agreed that the second alternative-requir-
ing a quality bond of contractors-would be a difficult solution.8 2 Per-
formance bonds are expensive and difficult to obtain in the construction
69 CH 1511 (complaint filed April 30, 1969, Circuit Court of Cook County):
Talman financed a condominium and thereafter, the builder became insolvent with
the result that Talman became assignee of the entire project and is now defendant in
a suit for damages incurred from structural defects and poor workmanship in the
condominium.
78. See e.g., Pastorelli v. Associated Engineers, Inc., 176 F.Supp 159 (D. R.I.
1959); Ehart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960); Miller v. Dea-
vitt, 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
79. Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452, 453-4, 151 N.W. 184,
185 (1915).
80. Supra note 63.
81. Supra notes 22, 29.
82. Supra notes 20, 55, 59, and 71.
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industry, and at least one loan officer expressed the opinion that a quality
bond would be prohibitively expensive if not impossible to obtain.83
Obtaining insurance coverage for its own liability is a third alternative
for institutional lenders. However, all loan officers of savings and loan
associations in Chicago who were interviewed expressed total ignorance
of the existence of policies covering lender liability for structural defects.
Only one official expressed confidence that a general "performance pol-
icy" carried by most lenders covering liability incurred by the insured in
the ordinary course of business would be adequate in a Connor-type situ-
ation. 4 Notwithstanding the general absence of insurance policies giving
extended coverage for structural defects, there should be little difficulty
in obtaining adequate coverage when the market for such insurance de-
velops.8 5 The liability incurred by an institutional lender is analogous to
that incurred by the manufacturer in the products liability field, and insur-
ance coverage has, in general, kept pace with that field.86 Adequate ex-
tended coverage has been noted to be available to builders incurring
strict liability for structural defects and poor workmanship, 7 so it should
be a simple matter to adjust such policies to the needs of lending institu-
tions. The cost of this insurance will be shifted directly to the builder,88
and ultimately to the purchaser.
CONCLUSION
The Connor case, then, does not appear to place an onerous burden on
savings and loan associations. The initial imposition of liability has been
on very narrow grounds, and extension of liability to relatively mundane
construction lending will take years-if it occurs at all. Finally, wherever
a duty of care is in fact imposed, it will require the lender to do no more
than ordinary business prudence dictates be done to protect the security
of the lender's investment.
Michael O'Connor
83. Supra note 59.
84. Supra note 61.
85. That is, when, if at all, other jurisdictions follow Connor and impose lia-
bility on lenders for structural defects.
86. 7A APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4508 (1962).
87. See Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc., 55 N.J. Super. 475, 484, 151
A.2d 48, 53 (1959); cf. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra note 76.
88. Supra note 63.
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